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MUNICIPAL COURTS IN TENNESSEE�A CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRIMER

This paper will first examine the constitutional and statutory underpin
nings of municipal courts in Tennessee.
Then it will briefly review the jurisi
diction of municipal courts, the selection of municipal court judges, and
municipal court penalties.
Finally, it will take a look at the recent case of
Summers v. Thompson, Tenn. Sup. Ct.,

No. 23,

filed May 23,

1988.

That case has

a significant bearing on all of those topics,

and it has some implications for
what municipal courts will look like in the future.
No pretense is made that
'•Very important thing is said or every important case is cited on those topics.
A certain amount of picking and choosing goes into every short treatment of any
major subject.
This paper is, as its title claims, only a primer.
Supra,
infra,

etc., in citations are used sparingly,

if at all, and page citations in

cases have been omitted.
An interesting observation in The Judicial System of Tennessee, published
in 1971 by The Institute of Judicial Administration under a grant from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration is appropriate here:
In the exercise of judicial power by the incorporated munici
palities of the state,

almost infinite variety creeps in the

treatment of traffic and other petty offenses.

Tennessee,

like many other states, has authorized municipal officers to
try violations of municipal ordinances and minor state offen
ses.

But unlike some of them, it has enshrined the practice

in its state constitution and failed to regulate the conduct
o f these courts by general law.

As a result,

there is a

b ewildering variety of part-time officials presiding over
municipal courts (usually at odd hours)

and there is equally

bewildering variety in the state law violations entrusted to
their jurisdiction.·

Some can impose jail sentences while

others are limited to imposing fines for violations of city
ordinances.

Some have committing power in the case of major

crimes so that they can bind defendants over for grand jury
action;

some cannot.

The same observation could have been made in 1988.
The Constitutional and Statutory Basis of Municipal Courts
The Constitutional Basis
Article VI, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such Circuit, Chancery and other
inferior courts as the Legislature shall from time to time,
ordain and establish; in the Judges thereof, and in Justices
of the peace.
The Legislature may also vest such juris
diction in Corporation Courts as may be deemed necessary.
Courts to be holden by Justices of the Peace may also be
established. [Emphasis mine].
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-2oration Courts" referred to in Art, VI, Section 1 are the courts of
)i!r�e "Corp
corporations, Gregory v, City of Memphis, 1 57 Tenn, 68, 6 S.W,2d 332
cipal
uni
, :.'in
v. State ex rel Phillips, 2 1 6 Tenn. 503, 392 S,W.2d 950 (1965),
Hill
7);
(
1
92
·'
The same is true of the metropolitan court established by the Nashville-Davidson
County Metropolitan Charter, State ex rel Boone v, Torrence, 470 S,W,2d 356
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1971),
A municipal court created by the legislature which has jurisdiction to hear
only municipal charter and ordinance violation cases is a "corporation court"
and not a "constitutional court" State v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 5 1 0 , 322 s. W,2d 2 1 4
( 1 959); Summers v . Thompson, (Tenn, Sup. Ct,, No, 23, filed May 23, 1 988),
The Statutory Basis
T,C,A. 1 6 - 1 - 1 0 1 provide11 that

I
!
I

i

l

\
'

Ii

,I I,

The judicial power of the state is vested in the judges of
the courts of general sessions, recorders of certain towns
snd cities, county courts, circuit courts, criminal courts,
common law and chancery courts, chancery courts, Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court and other courts created by
law.
Municipal courts are authorized under this section to be created by the
l egislature and under Article VI, Section l of the Tennessee Constitution.
Deming v. Nichols, 1 35 Tenn, 295, 1 86 s.w. 1 1 3 (1916),
As far as it can be determined , the legislature has authorized every muni
cipality in Tennessee, through its charter or by statute, to establish a munici
pal court. T,C.A. 1 6-17- 1 0 1 authorizes home rule municipalities to establish
municipal courts, and in those home rule municipalities which already have a
municipal court, to increase the number of divisions of the same, It is not
clear whether this statute is supplemental and in addition to the authority
granted in the charters of home rule municipalities to establish municipal
c ou-rts, That issue will be. discussed in more detail in the sections on
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts, and Municipal Judges. T,C,A. 1 6- 1 8- 1 0 1
authorizes the governing body of any municipality having a mayor's o r a
recorder's court, and no other provision for a city judge, to provide by
ordinance for the office of a city judge,
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts
General
The legislature may vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts as it may
deem necessary. Artic le VI, Section l of the Tennessee Constitution. The
legislature has deemed it necessary to give every municipal court the authority
to hear ordinance violation cases. A few municipal courts have the authority to
hear charter violation cases, although it is not clear how such cases are heard.

-3unicipaliti·�s, possibly the majority of them, have the addi
ge grou p of m
nal authority to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of justices of
courts of gen•aral sessions in criminal cases.
Some charter pro
e peac e or of
iisions granting the municipal court concurrent jurisdiction expressly limit the
concurre nt jurisdiction to jurisdiction to hold preliminary hearings.
¥any

municipal courts which have c,oncurrent jurisdiction do not exercise it.

A

municipality cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction absent an express grant of
authority by the General Assembly giving it such authority,
Hill v. State ex

rel Phillips, 216 Tenn.

503, 392 S.W,2d 950 (1965),

Jurisdiction prescribed by the charter
Some private act charters prescribe concurrent jurisdiction, others

prescribe jurisdiction only in ordinance violation cases.

Each private act

municipal charter must be examined to determine the extent of the municipal

court's jurisdiction.

Under the general law mayor-aldermanic and modified city

manager-council charters the municipal court has jurisdiction in ordinance
T.C.A. 6-1-405, 6-2-403 and
violation cases and concurrent jurisdiction.

6-33-103,

There are two classes of courts under the general law uniform city

manager-commission charter:

a small class falling within certain population

brackets has jurisdiction in ordinance violation cases and concurrent juris
diction,

cases.

while the larger class has jurisdiction in only ordinance violation

T.C.A. 6-21-501.

Municipal courts in home rule municipalities have

jurisdiction in ordinance violation cases and concurrent jurisdiction (T,C,A.

16-17-101 and 16-17-103), except for the municipal court in Knoxville whose con
current jurisdiction was abolished by T,C,A, 40-4-121--40-4-124,
City of
Knoxville· ex rel Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193

(Tenn. 1984),

A confusing aspect of municipal court Jurisdiction in home rule municipali

ties is that many such municipalities have established municipal courts under
provisions of their charters.

Some of those provisions are not consistent with

T.c.A. 16-17-101 et seq., which purports to govern the establishment of munici

pal courts in "all"

home rule munlcipalities,

judges to staff those courts.

and the selection of municipal

What is not clear is whether T.c.A. 16-17-101

supplements the authority granted home rule municipalities in their charters to
establish municipal courts or whether it supercedes it.

The Tennessee Attorney

General has opined that an amendment to the Lenoir City Charter which gave the
city judge jurisdiction to hear ordinance and charter violation cases and mis

demeanors adopted from state laws is not the exclusive provision granting juris

diction to municipal courts in home rule municipalities, that such municipalities

also have concurrent jurisdiction under T.C.A. 16-17-101.

OAG 85-047 (2/21/85).

As will be pointed out in the section on Municipal Jud ges, the same opinion

declares that a Lenoir City charter (home rule) amendment providing for the at

will appointment of municipal judges was a
that the latter supercedes the former.

l

violation of T.C.A. 16-17-102, and

In all references to the judicial powers,

duties,

functions and

jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the T.C.A. the term "justice of the
peace" and any variation thereof was changed to "court of general session" or
"judge of the court of general sessions" by T.c.A. 16-1-112,

-4-

The Limited Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts
Witho ut Concurrent Jurisdiction
With respect to those municipal courts which do not have concurrent juris
diction, the Tennessee Supreme Court said in the important case of Summers v.
Thompson, Tenn. Sup. Ct., No. 23, filed May 23, 1988
The jurisdiction of these city courts is wholly limited to
traffic violations or violations of city ordinances, as the
judges of these courts have no authority to impose fines
exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of imprisonment
and, as a practical matter, are essential ly administrative
judges, Such a judge is not cloaked with the powers of a
judge of an inferior court within the meaning of Article VI,
§ 6 [of the Tennessee Constitution).
Some Statutory Contractions or Expansions of Jurisdiction
The legislature has also seen fit to restrict the jurisdiction of municipal
courts in certain traffic cases, Under T.C,A. 55-10-307, the fol l owing offenses
are exclusively state offenses and must be tried in state court or a court
having concurrent jurisdiction: driving while intoxicated or drugged, as prohi
bited by T,C,A. 55-10-401; failing to stop after a traffic accident, as prohi
bited by T,C,A. 55-10-101 et seq,; driving while license is suspended or
revoked, as prohibited by T.C,A, 55-7-116; and drag racing, as prohibited by
T,C.A. 55-10-501,
Judges of juvenile courts are authorized to waiver jurisdiction over traf
fic offenders over the age of sixteen and allow such cases to be heard by traf
fic courts having jurisdiction of adult traffic violations. T,C, A, 37-1-146.
Such courts undoubtedly include municipal courts presiding over the area in
which the traffic offense occurred,
Municipal Judges
General
The appointment and terms of municipal judges are prescribed by the munici
pal charter. However, as th". last section in this paper, titled Summers v.
Thompson, reflecting the impc:ortant Tennessee Supreme Court opinion of the same
name, handed down May 23, 191':8 will point out, the at will appointment of muni
cipal court judges, particularly those with concurrent jurisdiction, is under
legal attack.
Private Act Charters
Presently , under privat•i act charters the municipal judge may be the mayor
or the recorder, or another person sel e cted by the governing body. In a few
cases the municipal judge is elected by the voters, usual l y for a short term.
Some municipal judges appointed under private act charters are appointed

-5term and are removable only for cause; others serve at the will
.. for a defi nite
�
body. The private act charter may or may not prescribe quali
governing
the
of
fications for the office. A common qualification is that the appointee be a
licensed attorney.
General Law Charters
Under the general law mayor-aldermanic charter the ma yor or "The recorder
or some other other proper designated officer" is the municipal judge,
T.C.A.
6-1-406 and T.C, A. 6-2-403. No term of office is specified.
A city court is required to be established under the general law uniform
city manager-commission charter, presided over by a city judge. T.C.A.
6-21-501. In those cities having city courts with concurrent jurisdiction, the
city judge is appointed by, and serves at the will of, the board of com
missioners, and must be an attorney. T,C, A. 6-21-50l(b). In those cities with
a city court having jurisdiction only over over ordinance violations, the city
judge also serves at the will and pleasure of the board of commissioners, but
the botnd sets his qualifications; or, if the board appoints no other person to
fill the office of city judge, the the recorder serves that function. T, C.A.
6-21-50l(a). The duties of the city judge and the operation of the court under
the general law uniform manager-commission charter are set out in considerable
detail in T.C.A. 6-21-502 through 6-21-508.
Under the general law modified city manager-council charter the city judge
must be a licensed attorney and be elected by popular vote for a term of four
years. He can be removed for cause for the same causes and in the same manner
provided for under the Ouster Law (T.c.A. Title 8, Chapter 47) , and the city
council fills vacancies in the office of the city judge between elections.
T, C.A. 6-33-102--6-33-103,
Home Rule Charters
T.C.A. Title 16, Chapter 17 contains provisions governing city courts in
home rule municipalities, including their establishment, the creation of addi
tional court divisions, and for the appointment and election of city judges. As
was pointed out in the preceding section titled Jurisdiction of Municipal
Courts, it is not clear whether those provisions are supplemental to, or super
cede, those provisions in home rule charters governing municipal courts. It can
be argued that they apply only to those municipal courts established under the
authority of T.C.A., Title 16, Chapter 17. The problem with that arg ument is
that the statute provides thst it applies to "all" home rule municipal courts.
One of the provisions directs that the city judge "shall be appointed on
the nomination of the mayor or chief executive officer, concurred in by the city
council or other legislative body, but said judges so appointed shall run for
election in the next general election." T.C.A. 16-17-102. No term of office is
prescribed. The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that an amendment to the
Lenoir City Charter providing that the municipal court judge be appointed by,
and serve at the pleasure of, the city council, violates T.C.A. 16-17-102, OAG
85-047 (2/21/85).

-6In any event, some home rule charters have adopted some or all of the pro
Nisions of the general law charters, including those governing the appointment
·
of municipal court judges; others may have adopted different provisions for the
selection of the municipal judge. Probably under most home rule charter
provisions, the municipal judge is appointed by, and serve at the will and
pleasure of the municipal governing body,
Miscellaneous
Municipal judges are magi:1trates under a statute that defines the term to
include "the mayor or city or municipal judge or chief officer and the recorder
of any incorporated city or town," T.C.A. 38-4-101,
Where the municipal judge is also the mayor, recorder or other municipal
official, that combination of the executive and the judiciary may be subject to
constitutional challenge. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 490 U.S. 57
( 1972),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for the mayor to sit as city judge where the
city derived a major portion of its income from fines, forfeitures, costs and
fees. The financial responsibilities of the mayor may deprive him of the
neutrality essential to impartial judgments.
The city judge in municipalities over 1601000 population must be a lawyer
licensed to practice law in Tunnessee. T.C.A. 17-l-106(d),
Punalties and Punishment

Private Act Charters
Some private act municipal charters restrict municipal courts to levying a
fine of not to exceed fifty dollars and make no provision for a jail sentence
some provide for a fine exceeding
for the violation o f municipal ordinances;
fifty dollars and/or a jail term of a certain period for such offenses.
General Law Charters
The general law mayor-aldermanic charter contains a list of corporate
powers, one of which is "To impose and collect fines and forfeitures for
breaches and violations of its ordinances ... " No jail term is provided. T.c.A.
6-2-201(17).
The general law uniform city manager-commission charter provides for a fine
of fifty dollars and imprisonment not to exceed ninety days!
T.C.A.
6-19-101(29),
A subsequent provision of the same charter gives the city judge
the authority to " p unish by fine or imprisonment or both for violation of city
ordinances," That provision limits the fine to fifty dollars, but somewhat
inconsistent with the term of imprisonment authorized above, provides that in
default of payment of fines, · costs and forfe,itures the city judge is authorfaed
to commit the offender to the workhouse for a maximum of thirty days for any
one offense, T.C.A. 6-21-502,

-7The general law modified city manager-council charter, in a left-handed
fashion, provides for the same penalt ies as the general law uniform city
manager-commission charter. T.C.A. 6-33-101.
Home Rule Municipalities
Home rule municipalities have the authority to impose a thirty day jail
sentence and a fift y dollar fine for the violation of municipal ordinances.
T.c.A. 6-54-306, Some home rule municipalities have conflicting chart er provi
sions which provide for more or less severe aut horit y,
The Question of Fines or "Penalties Over $50 for Municipal Violations
It is doubtful that any municipal court can levy a fine over $50 on a
municipal ordinance violator. Article 6, Sect ion 14 of the Tennessee
Const itut ion provides that
No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall
exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury
of his peers, who shall assess the fine at t he t ime t hey find
t he fact , if t hey t hink the fine should be more than fifty
dollars.
A t rial court judge in a felony case has the authority to levy a fine
exceeding fift y dollars on a defendant who has waived his right to have the fine
assessed b y a jury. State v. Durso, 645 S,W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) ; State v.
Purkey, 689 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), But t here is no provision in
t he Tennessee Constitut ion or statute for a trial by jury in mun.icipal court .
The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that in t he absence of such authority
a municipal court judge may not levy a fine exceeding fifty dollars for a muni
cipal ordinance violation. OAG 84-291 ( 10/31/84).
It has been held t hat municipal courts can impose a " penalt y , " as opposed
t o a fine, exceeding fifty dollars on the grounds that municipal ordinance
violation cases are civil act:tons rat her t han criminal prosecutions. O'Dell v,
Knoxville, 54 Tenn. App. 59, 388 S.W.2d 150 (1964). O'Dell is probably not
.'�ood law today in the face of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County v, Miles, 524 S.W.Zd 656 (1975). That case involved the question of
whether a de novo retrial in circuit court of a case tried and dismissed in
municipal court would const itute double jeopardy in violation of bot h t he U.S.
and Tennessee Constitut ions, Declaring that 01 Dell had already been impliedly
overruled in earlier cases, t he Tennessee Supreme Court declared t hat
a proceeding in a municipal court for the imposition of a
fine upon a person for allegedly violating a city ordinance
is criminal rather than civil in substance, in t hat, it seeks
punishment to vindicate public justice and, t herefore,
constitutes jeopardy under t he double jeopardy clauses of the
Tennessee and F ederal Constitut ions
• • •

• • •

-8Presumably, Miles also repudiates O'Del l's theory that "a penalty is not a
fine" in municipal ordinance violation cases.
The Question of Jail Sent:ences for Municipal Violations
It is general l y believed that municipal judges have no authority to
impose a jail sentence for tht.! violation of a municipal ordinance, not
withstanding municipal charter provisions to the contrary. Articl e I, Section 6
of the Tennessee Constitution provides that " The right of trial by jury shall
, " and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution
remain inviolate
declares "That in all criminal prosecutions, "the accused has certain rights,
including, "in prosecutions by indictment or presentment, a speedy public
trial , by an impartial jury..." There are no provisions for a trial by jury in
municipal courts in Tennessee. But it is not necessaril y the absence of such
provisions that represent an impediment to the imposition of jail sentences for
the violation of municipal ordinances. Those offenses which were "petty offen
ses" at common law are not subject to the constitutional mandate of a jury
trial. The impediment is that an offense for which a jail term can be imposed
was not a petty offense at common law,
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Willard
v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S, W, 2d 99 (1939) said
• • •

JI

Our decisions hol d that this constitutional provision
[Artic le I, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution] protects
the right of trial by jury onl y as it existed at common law
insofar as it had been adopted and was in force in North
Carolina,
when the territory embraced in Tennessee was ceded
by North Carolina to the Federal Government. [Citations
omitted] , , , Misdemeanors not invol ving life or liberty may -,,
be tried under the constitution without a jury because such
_
misdemeanors were triable under the common law without a jury.

�
_

"i

The Court went on to explain that in earlier cases it had distinguished between
"misdemeanors general l y and petty misdemeanors."
The latter were misdemeanors
"punishable by a fine of not more than $50 without imprisonment, except for non
payment of fine and costs." Willard stands for the proposition that if life and
l iberty can be taken by a municipal judge, the constitutional right to a jury
trial attaches under Article I, Section 6. The corol lary is that because there
is no right to a jury trial in municipal court in Tennessee, a municipal judge
cannot impose a jail sentence for the violation of a municipal ordinance.
However, there is no apparent reason why the legislature could not authorize and
provide for jury trials in municipal courts in Tennessee.
In the more recent case of City of Gatlinburg v. Goans, 600 S, W, 735 ( Tenn.
Ct. App. 1980), a defendant, relying upon both Sections 6 and 9 of Article I of
the Tennessee Constitution, demanded a jury trial on appeal to circuit court
from two convictions in municipal court for which he had been fined $20 in one
case and $25 in another. Under the Gatlinburg City Charter an ordinance viola
tor could be fined only fifty dol lars; no jail sentence cou l d be imposed,
The
Court of Appeals, citing O'Del l and other cases, decl ared that "Our courts have
consistentl y hel d that pe rsoMcharged with petty offenses and violation of city
ordinances are not, as a matter of right, entitle d to a trial by jury under the
provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions." The liberty of the
defendant in that case was not in jeopardy.

-9What makes the answer to the question of whether a municipal judge can
impose a jail sentence for th<, violation of a municipal ordinance slightly
uncertain is that the Tenness<,e Supreme Court in Summers v. Thompson, without
disapproval, declared that because municipal judges "have no authority to
impose fines exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of imprisonment" they are
essentially administrative judges. The Court had before it the general law
municipal charters, one of which permits a municipal judge to jail a defendant
for ninety days! But what the Court was considering when it made that statement
was whether such authority constituted an exercise of judicial power under
Article 6 of the Tennessee Constitution, not whether such authority triggered
the right to a jury trial undnr Article l of the Tennessee Constitution. But
that statement opens a crack on a door thought closed; perhaps on reflection the
Court would close it again.
Incidentally, under Rule 23, Tenn, R, Crim, P, " small offenses" may also be
tried without a jury. Such offenses may include criminal contempt for which a
jail term may be imposed, Robinson v. Gaines, 725 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. Cr. App.
1986), and other cases cited therein as well as in City of Gatlinburg v. Goans.
'lowever, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for over six months a U.S.
Constitutional right to a jury trial attaches. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U,S. 66 (1970).
Although municipal courts probably cannot impose a jail term for the viola
tion of municipal ordinances, it is generally agreed that they may impose a jail
sentence for the willful refusal or neglect to pay a fine. The maximum prac
tical sentence a municipal judge can impose for the refusal to pay a fine for
the violation of a municipal ordinance is ten (10) days or one day for each five
d ollars of the fine. T.C.A. 40-24-104(a) (4) and (5)), However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that an indigent defendant cannot be jailed for failure
to pay a fine, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Bearden v. Georgia, 461
u.s. 660, (1983).
Collection of fines
The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that a capias may be issued for
a defendant who has refused to respond to a summons to show cause for failing to
pay a fine previously imposed for the violation of a municipal ordi nance. OAG
U-87-28 (3/12/87). An unpaid municipal court fine may also be collected in the
same manner as a judgment in a civil action. T, C.A. 40-24-105,
A municipal
court may also issue execution on judgments for fines and costs which remain
unpaid for thirty days. T, C.A. 6-54-303. lf those processes are ever used,
t hey are used infrequently.
Contempt Powers
A m unicipal court has the power, as do other courts, to punish for contempt.
T.C.A, 16-1-103 contains a list of powers held by "every court, " including the
power to enforce order necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance or
hinderance of its proceedings, and to compel obedience to its orders, judgments
and process. T.C.A, 16-1-103 provides that "For the effectual exercise of its
powers, every court is vested with power to punish for contempt, as

-10provided for in this code, " Also see May v, Krichbaum, 152 Tenn, 416, 278 s.w.
54 (1925) ,
The power of any court, including a municipal court, to punish for
contempt is limited to the conduct listed in T, C, A, 29-9-102. Among other
things, the conduct generally involves willful misbehavior in court, the willful
disobedience to the commands of the court, T, C, A, 29-9-102, But the power of
municipal courts to punish for contempt is limited to a fine of $10,
T, C, A.
29-9-103.
Summers

v.

Thompson

The At Will Status of Municipal Court Judges Under Attack
The at will status under the general law uniform commission-manager form of
g overnment was challenged in Summers v, Thompson, (Tenn. Sup, Ct, , No, 23, filed
May 23, 1988),
In that case, the Soddy-Daisy city judge was summarily removed
by the Soddy-Daisy board of commissioners after a feud between the board and the
judge over the operation of the court and the disposition of DUI cases. The
city judge challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the at will employment
of city judges violated the separation of power provisions of Article II,
Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution.
In a narrow ruling the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
Soddy-Daisy Board of Commissioners to terminate the city judge at will,
It bypassed the constitutional issue raised by the city judge, and resolved the
case on the construction of T.C, A, 6-21-501 and 16-18-101--102 (although it is
difficult to figure out why the latter statute was even at issue), The Court
was careful to note that
Moreover, the holding of this case is expressly limited to
those city courts th.at are not vested with concurrent
jurisdiction with a General Sessions Court, which is an
inferior court, under T, C.A, § 6-21-50l(b) or T, C, A. §
16-18-101 (Supp. 1987),
The jurisdiction of these city
courts is wholly limited to traffic violations or city ordi
nances, as the judges of these courts have no authority to
impose fines exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of
imprisonment and, as a practical matter, are essentially
a dministrative judges, Such a judge is not cloaked with the
powers of a judge of an inferior court within the meaning of
Article VI [of the Sonstitution of Tennessee).
T, C, A. 6-21-501 is one of the provisions of the general law uniform city
manager-commission charter governing the city court,
It contains two
subsections: Subsection (a) provides for a city court presided over by a city
judge who has jurisdiction only over ordinance violations and who serves at the
will and ple.asure of the board of commissioners;
Subsection (b) provides for
those city court which fall into certain population brackets to be presided over
by a city judge who has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of general session
and who also serves at the wl.11 and pleasure of the board of commissioners,

-11T.C.A. 16-18-101 authorizes the governing body of any municipality
ing a mayor's court or a court presided over by a recorder, and no other pro
:lsion for a city judge, to provide by ordinance for the office of city judge.
However, it does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on the court. T.C.A.
16-18-102(3) provides that the city judge serves at the pleasure of the muni
cipal governing body.
Thus, Summers is legal authority to terminate city judges at will in onl y
those T.C.A. 6-21-SOl (a) courts and in those city courts established under
T, C, A. 16-18-101. Neither class of courts has jurisdiction concurrent with that
of a court of general sessions. But presumab l y, under the logic of Summers,
municipal judges who do not have concurrent jurisdiction under private act char
ters can be terminated at wil l .
The Summers Court coul d find onl y two municipalities under the general law
uniform city manager-commission charter which fal l within the popul ation
brackets required under T.C.A, 6-21-SOl(b) to give their city courts jurisdic
tion concurrent with that of a court of general sessions: St, Joseph and
Loretto, in Lawrence County. In other words, Soddy-Daisy had a T.C.A.
6 -21-SOl(a) city court, which had no concurrent jurisdiction, rather than a
T, C, A., Section 6-21-SOl(b) city court, which does have concurrent jurisdiction.
" [ W) ithout any concurrent jurisdiction, a city judge of a subsection (a) court
does not exercise constitutional judicial power," declared the Court,
Summers And The Future of Municipal Courts
That is the limit of Summers. Technical ly, that case leaves until another
day the question of whether city judges who have concurrent jurisdiction under
.!!!!. city charter can be removed at wil l , but it unquestionabl y serves blunt
notice that in any future case invol ving a chal l enge to the removal of a city
court judge who has concurrent jurisdiction, municipal judges with such juris
diction will be found to be judges of inferior courts within the meaning of
Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution.
The significance of such a holding is seen in Article VI, Section 4 of the
Tennessee Constitution, which provides that
The judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other
inferior courts shall be elected by the qualified voters of
the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned.
Every Judge of such Courts shall be thirty years of age, and
shall before his election, have been a resident of the State
for five years and of the circuit or district one year. His
term of service shal l be eight years. [Emphasis mine]
The logical outcome of that language is that where the constitutional
issues raised in Summers are met squarely in a future case, the Court will hold
that municipal judges having concurrent jurisdiction with that of a sessions
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t ions contained in Article VI, Section 4.
In fact, in a strong concurring
opinion, Justice Drowota (who also wrote the majority opinion) declared that he
would hold that city judges who exercise concurrent jurisdiction with inferior
courts "must be elected for a term of eight (8) years as required by Article VI,
Section 4, and may not be removed except pursuant to the Cons titution of
Tennessee." That holding appears to merely await the right case.
It is difficult to predict the practical implications such a ruling would
have for municipal courts in Tennessee. None of the general law charters and
probably none of the private act and home rule charters provide for a term of
office and qualifications for the city judge consistent with that required of
judges of inferior courts under Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee
Constitution. Because there is presently no legislative authority in the
general law or in any charter, perhaps excepting the home rule charter, for a
municipal judge to be elected to an eight year term and meet the other qualifi
cations of Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution the Tennessee
General Assembly would have to legislate such authority. A home rule municipa
lity might, under the authority of T.C.A. Title 16, Chapter 17, or by an amend
ment to its charter by ordinance, provide that the municipal judge be elected
to an eight year term and meet the other terms of Article VI, Section 4. T.C.A.
Title 16, Chapter 17, while it provides for the election of the city judge
(after the initial appointment:), it provides for no term of office; therefore,
an eight year term would be open to the municipality under that statute.
It is unlikely that the Tennessee Supreme Court would declare sitting muni
cipal judges having concurrenl: jurisdiction "elected" for terms of eight years.
Such a declaration would intrude on the rights of the legislature and the elec
torate, respectively, to create inferior courts, and to elect the judges of such
courts.
A possible course open to the Tennessee Supreme Court would be to hold
unconstitutional and void the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to municipal
courts whose judges are not elected for terms of eight years and meet the other
requirements of Article VI, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. See
Waters v. State ex rel Schmutzer, 583 S,W.2d 756 (1979). That would be Justice
Drowata 1 s approach.
What would be the status of all the cases adjudicated by the municipal
courts in Tennessee under the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction found to have
been unconstitutionally bestowed upon them?
Arguably the judges of those courts
would be de facto judges and the adjudica tions would stand. In Waters the
Tennessee Supreme Court was faced with resolving a competing claim to the office
of juvenile court judge by Larry Waters, the Sevier County executive, and Henry
Og le, a local attorney. Waters, who was 26 years of age, claimed the office by
virtue of holding the office of county executive. Henry Ogle claimed the office
through his appointment as judge pro tempore by Harold Atchley, the county judge
pro tempore. Upon the death of the county judge, Atchley had been appointed
county judge pro tempore by the county court to serve until the next general
election. Atchley, who was not an attorney,, declared himself incompetent to
serve as juvenile court judge, and requested the Sevier County Bar association
to assist in the election of a juvenile court judge pro tempore p ursuant to
T.C.A, 17-225 [now T.C.A. 17-2-118), The Sevier County Bar Association elected
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Juvenile Judge. Og le served as the juvenile judge from April 23, 1978 until
September 1, 1978 when Waters assumed office as the county executive. But even
after Waters assumed office, Ogle claimed to hold the office of juvenile court
judge, on the grounds that Waters was constitutional l y disquali fied from hol ding
that office,

The Court pointed to T,C,A, 5-601 through 5-606 [ now 5-6-101 through
5-6-106) which govern the qualifications and term of county executives in
Tennessee, They provide, among other things, that county executives must be at
l east 25 years of age, meet certain residency requirements, and are elected for
a term of four years, In addition, under T,C,A, 5-606, the county executive
was vested with "the judicial authority formerl y exercised by the county judge,
county chairman, or other such elected official of county government. ,," [That
statute, now T. C. A. 5-6-106, was subsequently amended to delete that authority
i n response to the hol ding in this case], But a juvenile court is an inferior
court within the meaning of Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution, and judges
of inferior courts must be elected for a term of eight years and be thirty years
o f age under Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Neither the
term of office for county executive established under T,C, A. 5-601 [now 5-6-101]
nor Waters age (26), met those constitutional requirements; therefore, the grant
o f "judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, county chairman,
or other elected official of county government, " was unconstitutional .
But while Waters was not a de jure juvenile court judge he was a de facto
juvenile court judge by virtue of his induction into the office of county execu
tive, and in that capacity his acts as juvenile court judge were valid, declared
the Court.
The Court treated Ogle' s "election" to the office of juvenile court judge
a s if it were valid, but had "grave doubts" whether Atchl ey's declaration that
he was not competent to serve as juvenile court judge justified hol ding the
election. However, the Court declined to speci fical l y decide both that issue,
and what it called the " secondary question" of whether Ogle "if not a de Jure
juvenile court judge pro tempore, was, in view of his election by the bar and
his apparent acceptance as juvenile court judge by the bar, and the quarterly
county court •• , a de facto juvenile court judge pro tempore. " Those issues
wou l d be decided when and if they were raised by litigants who had appeared
before Ogle during the period April 23, 1978 to September 1, 1978,
The de facto judge approach of Waters seems both a legal l y sound and prac
tical way to handle jurisdictional cha l lenges to the decisions of municipal
judges operating under an unconstitutional grant of concurrent jurisdiction.

